Recently fair division theory has emerged as a promising approach for the allocation of multiple computational resources among agents. While in reality agents are not all present in the system simultaneously, previous work has studied static settings where all relevant information is known upfront. Our goal is to better understand the dynamic setting. On the conceptual level, we develop a dynamic model of fair division, and propose desirable axiomatic properties for dynamic resource allocation mechanisms. On the technical level, we construct two novel mechanisms that provably satisfy some of these properties, and analyze their performance using real data. We believe that our work informs the design of superior multiagent systems, and at the same time expands the scope of fair division theory by initiating the study of dynamic and fair resource allocation mechanisms.
INTRODUCTION
The question of how to fairly divide goods or resources has been the subject of intellectual curiosity for millennia. While early solutions can be traced back to ancient writings, rigorous approaches to fairness were proposed only as late as the mid Twentieth Century, by mathematicians and social scientists. Over time, fair division has emerged as an influential subfield of microeconomic theory. In the last few years fair division has also attracted the attention of AI researchers (see, e.g., [4, 12, 2] ), who envision applications of fair division in multiagent systems [3] . However, fair division theory has seen few applications to date.
It is only very recently that an exciting combination of technological advances and theoretical innovations has pointed the way towards concrete applications of fair division. In modern data centers, clusters, and grids, multiple computational resources (such as CPU, memory, and network bandwidth) must be allocated among heterogeneous agents. Agents' demands for resources is typically highly structured, as we explain below. Several recent papers [9, 8, 11, 6] suggest that classic fair division mechanisms possess excellent properties in these environments, in terms of their fairness guarantees as well as their game-theoretic properties.
Nevertheless, some aspects of realistic computing systems are beyond the current scope of fair division theory. Perhaps most importantly, the literature does not capture the dynamics of these systems. Indeed, it is typically not the case that all the agents are present in the system at any given time; agents may arrive and depart, and the system must be able to adjust the allocation of resources. Even on the conceptual level, dynamic settings challenge some of the premises of fair division theory. For example, if one agent arrives before another, the first agent should intuitively have priority; what does fairness mean in this context? We introduce the concepts that are necessary to answer this question, and design novel mechanisms that satisfy our proposed desiderata. Our contribution is therefore twofold: we design more realistic resource allocation mechanisms for multiagent systems that provide theoretical guarantees, and at the same time we expand the scope of fair division theory to capture dynamic settings.
Overview of model and results
As in previous papers (e.g., [8, 11] ), we assume that agents demand the resources in fixed proportions. Such Leontief preferences-as they are known in economics-are easily justified in typical settings where agents must run many instances of a single task (e.g., map jobs in the MapReduce framework). Hence, for example, an agent that requires twice as much CPU as RAM to run a task prefers to be allocated 4 CPU units and 2 RAM units to 2 CPU units and 1 RAM unit, but is indifferent between the former allocation and 5 CPU units and 2 RAM units.
We consider environments where agents arrive over time (but do not depart-see Section 7 for additional discussion of this point). We aim to design resource allocation mechanisms that make irrevocable allocations, i.e., the mechanism can allocate more resources to an agent over time, but can never take resources back.
We adapt prominent notions of fairness, efficiency, and truthfulness to our dynamic settings. For fairness, we ask for envy freeness (EF), in the sense that agents like their own allocation best; and sharing incentives (SI), so that agents prefer their allocation to their proportional share of the resources. We also seek strategyproof (SP) mechanisms: agents cannot gain from misreporting their demands. Finally, we introduce the notion of dynamic Pareto optimality (DPO): if k agents are entitled to k/n of each resource, the allocation should not be dominated (in a sense that will be formalized later) by allocations that divide these entitlements. Our first result (in Section 3) is an impossibility: DPO and EF are incompatible. We proceed by relaxing each of these properties.
In Section 4, we relax the EF property. The new dynamic property, which we call dynamic EF (DEF), allows an agent to envy another agent that arrived earlier, as long as the former agent was not allocated resources after the latter agent's arrival. We construct a new mechanism, DYNAMIC DRF, and prove that it satisfies SI, DEF, SP, and DPO.
In Section 5, we relax the DPO property. Our cautious DPO (CDPO) notion allows allocations to only compete with allocations that can ultimately guarantee EF, regardless of the demands of future agents. We design a mechanism called CAUTIOUS LP, and show that it satisfies SI, EF, SP, and CDPO. In a sense, our theoretical results are tight: EF and DPO are incompatible, but relaxing only one of these two properties is sufficient to enable mechanisms that satisfy both, in conjunction with SI and SP.
Despite the assumptions imposed by our theoretical model, we believe that our new mechanisms are compelling, useful guides for the design of practical resource allocation mechanisms in realistic settings. Indeed, in Section 6, we test our mechanisms on real data obtained from a trace of workloads on a Google cluster, and obtain encouraging results.
Related work
Walsh [13] proposed the problem of fair cake cutting where agents arrive, take a piece of cake, and immediately depart. The cake cutting setting deals with the allocation of a single, heterogeneous divisible resource; contrast with our setting, which deals with multiple, homogeneous divisible resources. Walsh suggested several desirable properties for cake cutting mechanisms in this setting, and showed that adaptations of classic mechanisms achieve these properties (Walsh also pointed out that allocating the whole cake to the first agent achieves the same properties). In particular, his notion of forward envy freeness, which is discussed below, is related to our notion of dynamic envy freeness.
The networking community has studied the problem of fairly allocating a single homogeneous resource in a queuing model where each agent's task requires a given number of time units to be processed. In other words, in these models tasks are processed over time, but demands stay fixed, and there are no other dynamics such as agent arrivals and departures. The well-known fair queuing [5] solution allocates one unit per agent in successive round-robin fashion. This solution has also been analyzed by economists [10] .
Previous papers on the allocation of multiple resources study a static setting. For example, Ghodsi et al. [8] proposed the dominant resource fairness (DRF) mechanism, which guarantees a number of desirable theoretical properties. Gutman and Nisan [9] considered generalizations of DRF in a more general model of utilities, and also gave a polynomial time algorithm for another mechanism that was constructed by Dolev et al. [6] . Parkes et al. [11] extended DRF in several ways, and in particular studied the case of indivisible tasks. Most recently, Ghodsi et al. [7] extended DRF to the queuing domain. We elaborate on several of these results below.
PRELIMINARIES
In our setting, each agent has a task that requires fixed amounts of different resources. The utility of the agent depends on the quantity (possibly fractional) of its tasks that it can execute given the allocated resources. Formally, denote the set of agents by N = {1, . . . , n}, and the set of resources by R, |R| = m. Let D ir denote the ratio between the maximum amount of resource r agent i can use given the amounts of other resources present in the system and the total amount of that resource available in the system, either allocated or free. In other words, D ir is the fraction of resource r required by agent i. Following [8] An allocation A allocates a fraction A ir of resource r to agent i, subject to the feasibility condition i∈N Air ≤ 1 for all r ∈ R. Throughout the paper we assume that resources are divisible and that each agent requires a positive amount of each resource, i.e., d ir > 0 for all i ∈ N and r ∈ R. Under such allocations, our model for preferences coincides with the domain of Leontief preferences, where the utility of an agent for its allocation vector A i is given by
In words, the utility of an agent is the fraction of its dominant resource that it can actually use, given its proportional demands and its allocation of the various resources. However, we do not rely on an interpersonal comparison of utilities; an agent's utility function simply induces ordinal preferences over allocations, and its exact value is irrelevant.
We say that an allocation A is Pareto dominated by another allocation A if ui(A i ) ≥ ui(Ai) for every agent i, and uj(A j ) > u j (Aj) for some agent j. For allocations A over agents in S ⊆ N and A over agents in T ⊆ N such that S ⊆ T , we say that A is an extension of A to T if A ir ≥ Air for every agent i ∈ S and every resource r. When S = T , we simply say that A is an extension of A.
An allocation A is called non-wasteful if for every agent i there exists y ∈ R + such that for all r ∈ R, Air = y · dir. Note that for a non-wasteful allocation, the utility of an agent is the share of its dominant resource allocated to the agent. Also, if A is a nonwasteful allocation then for all i ∈ N ,
(1)
DYNAMIC RESOURCE ALLOCATION: A NEW MODEL
We consider a dynamic resource allocation model where agents arrive at different times and do not depart (see Section 7 for a discussion of this point). We assume that agent 1 arrives first, then agent 2, and in general agent k arrives after agents 1, . . . , k − 1; we say that agent k arrives in step k. An agent reports its demand when it arrives and the demand does not change over time. Thus, at step k, demand vectors d ≤k are known, and demand vectors d >k are unknown. A dynamic resource allocation mechanism operates as follows. At each step k, the mechanism takes as input the reported demand vectors d ≤k and outputs an allocation A k over the agents present in the system. Crucially, we assume that allocations are irrevocable, i.e., A k ir ≥ A k−1 ir for every step k ≥ 2, every agent i ≤ k − 1, and every resource r. We assume that the dynamic allocation mechanism knows the total number of agents n upfront. This is the case in real-world systems where agents have contributed resources and these contributions are recorded, e.g., federated clouds and research clusters.
Previous work on static resource allocation (e.g., [8, 11] ) focused on designing mechanisms that satisfy four prominent desiderata. Three of these-two fairness properties and one game-theoretic property-immediately extend to the dynamic setting.
Sharing Incentives (SI). A dynamic allocation mechanism is SI if
. . , 1/n ) for all steps k and all agents i ≤ k. In words, when an agent arrives it receives an allocation that it likes at least as much as an equal split of the resources. This models a setting where agents have made equal contributions to the system and hence have equal entitlements.
Envy Freeness (EF). A dynamic allocation mechanism is EF if
for all steps k and all agents i, j ≤ k, that is, an agent that is present would never prefer the allocation of another agent.
Strategyproofness (SP). A dynamic allocation mechanism is
SP if no agent can misreport its demand vector and be strictly better off at any step k, regardless of the reported demands of other agents. Formally, a dynamic allocation mechanism is SP if for any agent i ∈ N and any step k, if A k i is the allocation to agent i at step k when agent i reports its true demand vector and B k i is the allocation to agent i at step k when agent i reports a different demand vector, then
We avoid introducing additional notations that will not be required later.
In the static setting, the fourth prominent axiom, Pareto optimality (PO), means that the mechanism's allocation is not Pareto dominated by any other allocation. Of course, in the dynamic setting it is unreasonable to expect the allocation in early stages to be Pareto undominated as we need to save resources for future arrivals (recall that allocations are irrevocable). We believe though that the following definition naturally extends PO to our dynamic setting.
Dynamic Pareto Optimality (DPO).
A dynamic allocation mechanism is DPO if at each step k, the allocation A k returned by the mechanism is not Pareto dominated by any other allocation B k that allocates up to a (k/n)-fraction of each resource among the k agents present in the system. Put another way, at each step the allocation should not be Pareto dominated by any other allocation that only redistributes the collective entitlements of the agents present in the system among those agents.
It is straightforward to verify that a non-wasteful mechanism (a mechanism returning a non-wasteful allocation at each step) satisfies DPO if and only if the allocation returned by the mechanism at each step k uses at least a (k/n)-fraction of at least one resource (the assumption of strictly positive demands plays a role here).
Impossibility Result
Ideally, we would like to design a dynamic allocation mechanism that is SI, EF, SP, and DPO. However, we show that even satisfying EF and DPO simultaneously is impossible. THEOREM 1. Let n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2. Then no dynamic resource allocation mechanism satisfies EF and DPO.
PROOF. Consider a setting with three agents and two resources. Agents 1 and 2 have demand vectors 1, 1/9 and 1/9, 1 , respectively (i.e., d 11 = 1, d12 = 1/9, etc.). At step 2 (after the second agent arrives), at least one of the two agents must be allocated at least an x = 3/5 share of its dominant resource, otherwise the total fraction each resource that is allocated at step 2 would be less than x + x · (1/9) = 2/3, violating DPO. Without loss of generality, assume that agent 1 is allocated at least an x = 3/5 share of its dominant resource (resource 1) at step 2. If agent 3 reports the demand vector 1, 1/9 -identical to that of agent 1-then it can be allocated at most a 2/5 share of its dominant resource (resource 1), and would envy agent 1.
It is easy to extend this argument to the case of n > 3, by adding n − 3 agents with demand vectors identical to the demand vector of agent 3. To extend to the case of m > 2, let all agents have negligibly small demands for the additional resources.
It is interesting to note that if either EF or DPO is dropped, the remaining three axioms can be easily satisfied. For example, the trivial mechanism EQUAL SPLIT that just gives every agent a 1/n share of each resource when it arrives satisfies SI, EF and SP. To achieve SI, DPO and SP, consider the following mechanism, which we call DYNAMIC DICTATORSHIP. At each step k, the mechanism allocates a 1/n share of each resource to agent k, takes back the shares of different resources that the agent cannot use, and then keeps allocating resources to agent 1 (the dictator) until a k/n share of at least one resource is allocated. Note that the mechanism trivially satisfies SI because it allocates resources as valuable as an equal split to each agent as soon as it arrives. The mechanism satisfies DPO because it is non-wasteful and at every step k it allocates a k/n fraction of at least one resource. It can be easily verified that DYNAMIC DICTATORSHIP is also SP.
Neither EQUAL SPLIT nor DYNAMIC DICTATORSHIP is a compelling mechanism. Since these mechanisms are permitted by dropping EF or DPO entirely, we instead explore relaxations of EF and DPO that rule these mechanisms out and permit more compelling mechanisms. Luckily, our mechanisms turn out to satisfy SI and SP as well.
RELAXING ENVY FREENESS
Recall that DPO requires a mechanism to allocate at least a k/n fraction of at least one resource at step k, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus the mechanism sometimes needs to allocate a large amount of resources to agents arriving early, potentially making it impossible for the mechanism to prevent the late agents from envying the early agents. In other words, when an agent i enters the system it may envy some agent j that arrived before i did; this envy is inevitable in order to be able to satisfy DPO. However, it would be unfair to agent i if agent j were allocated more resources since agent i arrived while i still envied j. To distill this intuition, we introduce the following dynamic version of EF.
. Dynamic Envy Freeness (DEF). A dynamic allocation mech-
anism is DEF if at any step an agent i envies an agent j only if j arrived before i did and j has not been allocated any resources since i arrived. Formally, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Walsh [13] studied a dynamic cake cutting setting and proposed forward EF, which requires that an agent not envy any agent that arrived later. This notion is weaker than DEF because it does not rule out the case where an agent i envies an agent j that arrived earlier and j received resources since i arrived. In our setting, even the trivial mechanism DYNAMIC DICTATORSHIP (see Section 3) satisfies forward EF, but fails to satisfy our stronger notion of DEF.
We next construct a dynamic resource allocation mechanism-DYNAMIC DRF-that achieves the relaxed fairness notion of DEF, together with SI, DPO, and SP. The mechanism is given as Algorithm 1. Intuitively, at each step k the mechanism starts from the current allocation among the present agents and keeps allocating resources to agents that have the minimum dominant share at the same rate, until a k/n fraction of at least one resource is allocated. Always allocating to agents that have the minimum dominant share ensures that agents are not allocated any resources while they are envied. This water-filling mechanism is a dynamic adaptation of the dominant resource fairness (DRF) mechanism proposed by Ghodsi et. al. [8] . See Figure 1 for an example. 
where the first transition follows from the construction of the feasible solution and the second transition holds because {x
satisfies the LP of step k − 1, and in particular the third constraint of the LP. Since a feasible solution achieves M k = 1/n, the optimal solution achieves M k ≥ 1/n. Thus in the optimal solution x k i ≥ M k ≥ 1/n for all i ≤ k, which is the requirement for SI. Next we show that DYNAMIC DRF satisfies DPO. Observe that at any step k, the third constraint of the LP must be tight for at least one resource in the optimal solution (otherwise every x k i along with M k can be increased by a sufficiently small quantity, contradicting the optimality of M k ). Thus, at each step k the (non-wasteful) mechanism allocates a k/n fraction of at least one resource, which implies that the mechanism satisfies DPO.
To prove that the mechanism satisfies DEF and SP, we first prove several useful lemmas about the allocations returned by the mechanism. In the proof below, M k and x k i refer to the optimal solution of the LP in step k. Furthermore, we assume that x k i = 0 for agents i > k (i.e., agents not present in the system are not allocated any resources). We begin with the following lemma, which essentially shows that if an agent is allocated some resources in a step using water filling, then the agent's dominant share after the step will be the minimum among the present agents.
PROOF. Consider any step k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. From the first and the second constraints of the LP it is evident that x Next we show that at each step k, the dominant shares of agents 1 through k are monotonically non-increasing with their time of arrival. This is intuitive because at every step k, agent k enters with zero dominant share and subsequently we perform water filling, hence monotonicity is preserved. 
LEMMA 4. For all agents i, j ∈ N such that i < j, we have x
k i ≥ x k j at every step k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
PROOF. Fix any two agents i, j ∈ N such that i < j.
, where the first and the last transition follow from Lemma 3 and the second transition follows from our induction hypothesis.
(Proof of Lemma 4)
The following lemma shows that if agent j has a greater dominant share than agent i at some step, then j must have arrived before i and j must not have been allocated any resources since i arrived. Observe that this is very close to the requirement of DEF. We proceed to show that DYNAMIC DRF satisfies DEF. We need to prove that for any step k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and any agents i, j ≤ k, if agent i envies agent j in step k (i.e., . Agent 1 receives a 1/3 share of its dominant resource at step 1. At step 2, water filling drives the dominant shares of agents 1 and 2 up to 4/9. At step 3, however, agent 3 can only receive a 1/3 dominant share and the allocations of agents 1 and 2 remain unchanged.
and agent i would not envy agent j. Now DEF follows from Lemma 5.
To prove that DYNAMIC DRF is SP, suppose for contradiction that an agent i ∈ N can report an untruthful demand vector d i such that the agent is strictly better off in at least one step. Let k be the first such step. Denote byx t j the dominant share of an agent j at step t with manipulation (for agent i, this is the share of the dominant resource of the untruthful demand vector) and similarly, denote byM t the value of M t in the optimal solution of the LP of step t with manipulation.
Here, the first transition follows from Lemma 5, the second transition holds because manipulation by agent i does not affect the allocation at step i − 1, and the third transition follows from the LP. For any agent j with x
The second transition is true because ifx
then agent i could not be better off as the true dominant share it receives with manipulation would be no more than it received without manipulation. To justify the third transition, note that agent i must be allocated some resources at step k with manipulation. If k = i, this is trivial, and if k > i, this follows because otherwise k would not be the first step when agent i is strictly better off as we would have (Proof of Lemma 6) Now, the mechanism satisfies DPO and thus allocates at least a k/n fraction of at least one resource at step k without manipulation. Let r be such a resource. Then the fraction of resource r allocated at step k with manipulation iŝ
To justify the inequality, note thatx k i ·d ir > x k i ·dir by Equation (1) (as agent i is strictly better off), and in additionx k j ≥ x k j for every j ≤ k. However, this shows that more than a k/n fraction of resource r must be allocated at step k with manipulation, which is impossible due to the third constraint of the LP. Hence, a successful manipulation is impossible, that is, DYNAMIC DRF is SP.
Finally, note that the LP has a linear number of variables and constraints, therefore the mechanism can be implemented in polynomial time.
(Proof of Theorem 2)
RELAXING DYNAMIC PARETO OPTI-MALITY
We saw (Theorem 1) that satisfying EF and DPO is impossible. We then explored an intuitive relaxation of EF. Despite the positive result (Theorem 2), the idea of achieving absolute fairness-as conceptualized by EF-in our dynamic setting is compelling.
As a straw man, consider waiting for all the agents to arrive and then using any EF static allocation mechanism. However, this scheme is highly inefficient, e.g., it is easy to see that one can always allocate each agent at least a 1/n share of its dominant resource (and other resources in proportion) as soon as it arrives and still maintain EF at every step. How much more can be allocated at each step? We put forward a general answer to this question using a relaxed notion of DPO that requires a mechanism to allocate as many resources as possible while ensuring that EF can be achieved in the future, but first we require the following definition. Given a step k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, define an allocation A over the k present agents with demands d ≤k to be EF-extensible if it can be extended to an EF allocation over all n agents with demands
. Cautious Dynamic Pareto optimality (CDPO).
A dynamic allocation mechanism satisfies CDPO if at every step k, the allocation A k returned by the mechanism is not Pareto dominated by any other allocation A over the same k agents that is EF-extensible.
In other words, a mechanism satisfies CDPO if at every step it selects an allocation that is at least as generous as any allocation that can ultimately guarantee EF, irrespective of future demands.
At first glance, it may not be obvious that CDPO is indeed a relaxation of DPO. However, note that DPO requires a mechanism to allocate at least a k/n fraction of at least one resource r * in the allocation A k at any step k, and thus to allocate at least a 1/n fraction of r * to some agent i. Any alternative allocation that Pareto dominates A k must also allocate at least a 1/n fraction of r * to agent i. Hence, in order to ensure an EF extension over all n agents when all the future demands are identical to the demand of agent i, the alternative allocation must allocate at most a k/n fraction of r * , as each future agent may also require at least a 1/n fraction of r * to avoid envying agent i. It follows that the alternative allocation cannot Pareto dominate A k . Thus, the mechanism satisfies CDPO. Recall that DYNAMIC DRF extends the water filling idea of the static DRF mechanism [8] to our dynamic setting. DYNAMIC DRF is unable to satisfy the original EF, because-to satisfy DPO-at every step k it needs to allocate resources until a k/n fraction of some resource is allocated. We wish to modify DYNAMIC DRF to focus only on competing with EF-extensible allocations, in a way that achieves CDPO and EF (as well as other properties).
The main technical challenge is checking when an allocation over k agents violates EF-extensibility. Indeed, there are uncountably many possibilities for the future demands d >k over which an EF extension needs to be guaranteed by an EF-extensible allocation! Of course, checking all the possibilities explicitly is not feasible. Ideally, we would like to check only a small number of possibilities. The following lemma establishes that it is sufficient to verify that an EF extension exists under the assumption that all future agents will have the same demand vector that is moreover identical to the demand vector of one of the present agents.
LEMMA 7. Let k be the number of present agents, d ≤k be the demands reported by the present agents, and A be an EF allocation over the k present agents. Then A is EF-extensible if and only if there exists an EF extension of A over all n agents with demands
To prove this lemma, we first introduce the notion of the minimum EF extension. Intuitively, the minimum EF extension is the "smallest" EF extension (allocating the least resources) of a given EF allocation to a larger set of agents. Formally, let A be an EF allocation over a set of agents S ⊆ N and A * be an EF extension of A to a set of agents T ⊆ N (S ⊆ T ). Then A * is called the minimum EF extension of A to T if for any EF extension A of A to T , we have that A is an extension of A * . We show that the minimum EF extension exists and exhibits a simple structure. PROOF. For agent i with dominant share xi to avoid envying agent j with dominant share x j , there must exist r ∈ R such that
, and thus the minimum dominant share is given by y j i = xj · minr∈R djr/dir. Now it is easy to argue that any EF extension A of A over T must allocate at least an x * i dominant share to any agent i ∈ T , for both i ∈ S and i ∈ T \ S, and thus A must be an extension of A * . It remains to prove that A * is EF. First we prove an intuitive result regarding the minimum dominant share agent i needs to avoid envying agent j, namely y j i . We claim that for every r ∈ R,
Indeed, to prevent agent i from envying agent j, we need to allocate no more than an x j · djr fraction of resource r to agent i for any r ∈ R. Formally, for any r ∈ R,
Next we show that A * is EF, i.e., no agent i envies any agent j in A * . We consider four cases. Case 1: i ∈ S and j ∈ S. This case is trivial as A * is identical to A over S and A is EF.
Case 2: i ∈ T \ S and j ∈ S. This case is also trivial because i receives at least a y Therefore, A * is an EF extension of A over T and we have already established that any EF extension of A over T must be an extension of A * . We conclude that A * is a minimum EF extension of A over T .
(Proof of Lemma 8)
It is not hard to see from the construction of the minimum EF extension that it not only exists, it is unique. We now prove Lemma 7.
PROOF OF LEMMA 7. The "only if" direction of the proof is trivial. To prove the "if" part, we prove its contrapositive. Assume that there exist future demand vectorsd >k ∈ D n−k such that there does not exist any EF extension of A to N with demandsd = (d ≤k ,d >k ) . We want to show that there exists d >k ∈ D for which there is no EF extension as well.
Let K = {1, . . . , k} and N \ K = {k + 1, . . . , n}. Denote the minimum EF extension of A to N with demandsd by A * . Let the dominant share of agent i ∈ K in A be x i and the dominant share of agent j ∈ N in A * be x * j . No EF extension of A over N with demandsd is feasible, hence A * must be infeasible too. Therefore, there exists a resource r such that
Consider the case where
locates an x i dominant share to every i ∈ K (same as A) and allocates exactly an x t dominant share to every j ∈ N \ K. Thus, the fraction of resource r allocated in A is The equivalent condition of Lemma 7 provides us with k · m linear constraints that can be checked to determine whether an allocation over k agents is EF-extensible. Using this machinery, we can write down a "small" linear program (LP) that begins with the both mechanisms satisfy SI. For upper bounds, we consider omniscient (hence unrealistic) mechanisms that maximize the objectives in an offline setting where the mechanisms have complete knowledge of future demands and only need to guarantee an EF extension on the real future demands rather than on all possible future demands. The comparison of CAUTIOUS LP with these offline mechanisms demonstrates the loss CAUTIOUS LP (an online mechanism) suffers due to the absence of information regarding the future demands, that is, due to its cautiousness. Because DYNAMIC DRF is not required to have an EF extension, the offline mechanisms are not theoretical upper bounds for DYNAMIC DRF, but our experiments show that they provide upper bounds in practice.
As our data we use traces of real workloads on a Google compute cell, from a 7 hour period in 2011 [1] . The workload consists of tasks, where each task ran on a single machine, and consumed memory and one or more cores; the demands fit our model with two resources. For various values of n, we sampled n random positive demand vectors from the traces and analyzed the value of the two objective functions under DYNAMIC DRF and CAUTIOUS LP along with the corresponding lower and upper bounds. We averaged over 1000 such simulations to obtain data points.
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the maxsum values achieved by the different mechanisms, for 20 agents and 100 agents respectively. The performance of our two mechanisms is nearly identical.
Figures 2(c) and 2(d) show the maxmin values achieved for 20 agents and 100 agents, respectively. Observe that DYNAMIC DRF performs better than CAUTIOUS LP for lower values of k, but performs worse for higher values of k. Intuitively, DYNAMIC DRF allocates more resources in early stages to satisfy DPO while CAU-TIOUS LP cautiously waits. This results in the superior performance of DYNAMIC DRF in initial steps but it has fewer resources available and thus lesser flexibility for optimization in later steps, resulting in inferior performance near the end. In contrast, CAU-TIOUS LP is later able to make up for its loss in early steps. Encouragingly, by the last step CAUTIOUS LP achieves near optimal maxmin value. For the same reason, unlike DYNAMIC DRF the maxmin objective value for CAUTIOUS LP monotonically increases as k increases in our experiments (although it is easy to show that this is not always the case).
DISCUSSION
We have presented a new model for resource allocation with multiple resources in dynamic environments that, we believe, can spark the study of dynamic fair division more generally. The model is directly applicable to data centers, clusters, and cloud computing, where the allocation of multiple resources is a key issue, and it significantly extends the previously studied static models. That said, the model also gives rise to technical challenges that need to be tackled to capture more realistic settings. First, our model assumes positive demands, that is, each agent requires every resource. To see how the positive demands assumption plays a role, recall that achieving EF and DPO is impossible. We established that dropping DPO leads to the trivial mechanism EQUAL SPLIT, which satisfies the remaining three properties; this is also true for possibly zero demands. When we dropped EF, we observed that the trivial mechanism DYNAMIC DICTATORSHIP satisfies SI, DPO and SP, and we subsequently suggested the improved mechanism DYNAMIC DRF that satisfies DEF in addition to SI, DPO and SP. Surprisingly though, it can be shown that neither DYNAMIC DICTATORSHIP nor DYNAMIC DRF are SP under possibly zero demands. 3 In fact, despite significant effort, we were Second, our analysis is restricted to the setting of divisible tasks, where agents value fractional quantities of their tasks. Parkes et. al. [11] consider the indivisible tasks setting, where only integral quantities of an agent's task are executed, albeit in a static environment. It can be shown that even forward EF-the weakest of all EF relaxations considered in this paper-is impossible to achieve along with DPO under indivisible tasks. It remains open to determine which relaxations of EF are feasible in dynamic resource allocation settings with indivisible tasks.
Third, while our model of fair division extends the classical model by introducing dynamics, and our results can directly inform the design of practical mechanisms, we do make the assumption that agents arrive over time but do not depart which justifies our assumption of irrevocable allocations. In reality, agents may arrive and depart multiple times, and their preferences may also change over time (note that changing preferences can be modeled as a departure and simultaneous re-arrival with a different demand vector). Departures without re-arrivals are easy to handle; one can allocate the resources that become free in a similar way to allocations of entitlements, e.g., using water filling. However, departures with rearrivals immediately lead to daunting impossibilities. Note though that mechanisms that were designed for static settings performed well in realistic (fully dynamic) environments [8] , and it is quite likely that our mechanisms-which do provide theoretical guarantees for restricted dynamic settings-would yield even better performance in reality.
